RUSSIA’S INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM

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Continuity

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1st CD
Espionage

SVR
Foreign Intelligence Service

2nd/3rd/5th CD
Polit. Sec.

FSB
Federal Security Service

9th CD
Praetorians

FSO
Federal Guard Service

8th/16th CD
SIGINT

FAPSI, then FSB/GRO
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SVR
Foreign Intelligence Service

FSB
Federal Security Service

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GRU
Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff

What is Distinctive?

- Overlapping Responsibilities
- Constant and direct turf wars—and not just for funding and access
- Emphasis on active operations
- “Wartime” mindset
- Corruption
- Level of political support under Putin
Overlapping Responsibilities

SVR
FSB
GRU

Overlapping Responsibilities

SVR
Crimea
FSB
GRU

Turf Wars

Key Resps.
Budgets
Business Opps.

Putin's Ear

CONFLICT

Turf Wars

Key
Budgets
Business Opps.

2000-2 ‘Tri Kita’ case

2003, end of FAPSI
Active Operations

- Gather Intel.
- Espionage
- Inform Policy
- Advocacy
- Direct Ops
- Action

Wartime Mindset

- Zero-Sum/Cold War
  - “If the West loses, we gain”
- Sense of Real Threat
  - “Russia is at risk”
- Action-oriented
  - “Better action than inaction”

Corruption

- Lack of Transparency
- Lack of Controls
- Information & Force
- Culture of Corruption

Sub-Lt Jeffrey DeLisle
Outcomes

- Massive and sustained expansion in networks and increased scale, tempo and aggressiveness of ops
- Relative lack of oversight, so long as believed to be delivering
- High level of corruption
- Unwillingness to tell hard truths
- Takes heavy Kremlin pressure to get them to “play nice”

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“the threat from Russian espionage continues to be significant and is similar to the Cold War ... the number of Russian intelligence officers in London is at the same level as in Soviet times.”

-- MI5, 2010
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Conclusion: Beware what you wish for

- They are technically highly capable, even if sometimes badly tasked
- They now reinforce Putin's assumptions, not inform his world view
- They reinforce the world’s view of Putinism
- They are cynical opportunists at home, loyal to themselves