

RUSSIA'S INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM

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Continuity



Continuity



1 st CD Espionage	→	SVR Foreign Intelligence Service
2 nd /3 rd /5 th CD Polit. Sec.	→	FSB Federal Security Service
9 th CD Praetorians	→	FSO Federal Guard Service
8 th /16 th CD SIGINT	→	FAPSI, then FSB/ GRU

Continuity



SVR

Foreign
Intelligence
Service

Continuity



FSB

Federal Security
Service

Continuity






GRU


Main Intelligence
Directorate of the
General Staff

What is Distinctive?

- ✿ Overlapping Responsibilities
- ✿ Constant and direct turf wars—and not just for funding and access
- ✿ Emphasis on active operations
- ✿ “Wartime” mindset
- ✿ Corruption
- ✿ Level of political support under Putin



Active Operations



Wartime Mindset

Zero-Sum/Cold War

- “If the West loses, we gain”


Sense of Real Threat

- “Russia is at risk”

Action-oriented

- “Better action than inaction”

Corruption



Corruption

Sub-Lt Jeffrey DeLisle

Culture of Corruption



Outcomes

- ⊗ Massive and sustained expansion in networks and increased scale, tempo and aggressiveness of ops
- ⊗ Relative lack of oversight, so long as *believed* to be delivering
- ⊗ High level of corruption
- ⊗ Unwillingness to tell hard truths
- ⊗ Takes heavy Kremlin pressure to get them to “play nice”

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“the threat from Russian espionage continues to be significant and is similar to the Cold War ...the number of Russian intelligence officers in London is at the same level as in Soviet times.”
-- MI5, 2010

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Conclusion: Beware what you wish for

- ⊗ They are *technically* highly capable, even if sometimes badly tasked
- ⊗ They now reinforce Putin’s assumptions, not inform his world view
- ⊗ They reinforce the world’s view of Putinism
- ⊗ They are cynical opportunists at home, loyal to themselves